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1. INTRODUCTION
1
In the late eighties, as it became evident that the Brazilian economy would have to go
through a serious fiscal-adjustment effort, the possibility of meeting a sizable part of the
required adjustment from the revenue side was seen with skepticism. Over the previous
20 years, the aggregate tax burden had remained remarkably stable, fluctuating around a
fourth of GDP. And, in fact, the evolution of the tax revenue in the early nineties would
lend force to that skepticism. Though the tax burden was hiked up in 1990, as a result of a
once-and-for-all federal revenue increase produced by the Collor stabilization plan, it was
brought back to an average of roughly 25 percent of GDP over the 1991-93 period. It was
really hard to envisage by then that, in the end of the nineties, the tax burden would have
reached 32 percent of GDP, more than 6 percentage points above the 1991-93 average, as
may be seen in Table 1.1.
It seems almost incredible that such an impressive increase in the aggregate tax revenue
could after all be obtained in such a short period. And it is that raise in the tax burden that
explains most of the remarkable fiscal adjustment that has been allowing the
consolidation of the stabilization effort, that has been carried out in the country since
1993. The feasible fiscal adjustment ended up being very different from what would be
desirable. A strong political coalition prevented the advancement of reforms that could
open way to a deeper cutback in expenditure programs that remain protected by the
Constitution. And most of the adjustment had to stem from the revenue side. In order to
keep public accounts under a reasonable degree of control, with public indebtedness in a
sustainable path, it became necessary to extract from society almost a third of GDP in
taxes. By all means an overexertion, given the stage of development of the Brazilian
economy.
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But the three levels of government in Brazil are not only collecting 32 percent of GDP in
taxes. They are doing it in a very clumsy way. A large and increasing part by means of the
worst kind of taxes. But despite all the public outcry and significant mobilization of both
the Executive and Congress with the idea of a tax reform, so far there is no effective
headway to be seen.
Table 1.1
Brazil, Gross Tax Burden
1968-1999
Period Tax Revenue of All Government Levels









Source: 1968-1998, Secretaria para Assuntos Fiscais, BNDES; 1999, IBGE
This paper is an attempt to assess what has happened and why progress has been so
disappointing. It starts with a very short section on the deterioration of the Brazilian tax
system, followed by a section analyzing tax-reform initiatives since 1997, and how they
recently ended in deadlock. Section 4, raises a number of important points that one has to
take into account to fully grasp the difficulties that are to be faced by the reform, from an
aggregate point of view. In order to analyze those points more carefully, a simple
consistency model is presented in section 5 and used for simulations in section 6. The
ending section calls attention to how fiscal-federalism difficulties have considerably
amplified the complexity of the reform.5
In all fairness, it should be noted that the term tax reform will be used throughout the
paper to mean indirect-taxation reform. In what concerns taxes on profits and personal
income, though the tax base is far from being properly exploited, there have been
increasing rationality and significant improvements over the last few years. Also, the tax
collection apparatus has become much more effective, as it is being rapidly modernized,
particularly at the federal level. Although the analysis of such achievements is beyond the
scope of the present paper, they should not go unnoticed.6
2. THE DETERIORATION OF THE BRAZILIAN INDIRECT TAX SYSTEM
Back in the mid-sixties, a very commendable tax reform, including a pioneering value-
added taxation scheme, was successfully implemented in Brazil.
2 But over the last thirty
years much of what was achieved by that refurbishment was lost, as the quality of the
Brazilian tax system went through a clear and worrying deterioration process, at least in
what concerns the taxation of goods and services.
It is impossible to understand what happened to the tax system since the sixties without
having in mind the economic and political difficulties faced by the country over the last
two decades. The first half of the eighties were marked by the end of the military regime
and the enormous resistance of the public opinion to the idea that a long period of forty
years of rapid economic growth had finally come to an end, in the wake of a combination
of adverse external conditions and major blunders in economic policy, particularly in
1979 and 1980. In early 1985, the military would walk way, leaving behind an economy
in disarray, with an unsolved 200-percent-a-year inflation problem, bound to snowball
into an even bigger trouble that would haunt the country for the next ten years.
Fighting high inflation would become the dominant public-policy issue of the reborn
democratic regime. The pressing need to deal with this problem and the early failures of
the new civilian government to implement a successful stabilization plan would greatly
aggravate the difficulties the country would have to face in the coming years. Actually, it
should be remembered that the redemocratization process had suffered a major blow at
the very moment of its inception. Unluckily, Tancredo Neves, an able and influential
politician, who had been elected the first president of the civilian regime by an impressive
coalition of political forces, died before taking office, opening the way to a considerably
less endowed and less influential vice-president. During the first three years of his
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government, Congress was drafting a new Constitution which was finally promulgated in
late 1988.
Unfortunately, the long and delicate political negotiations which brought about the new
Constitution took place exactly when the central government had become notably feeble,
due to the shortcomings of President Sarney, accidentally inducted into office, and
continuously mobilized by the quest for a higher degree of legitimacy. In fact, the central
government became even feebler after the failure of two stabilization shocks, in 1986 and
1987. And those politically costly fiascoes would open the way for the major constitution-
reform blunder of 1988. A long-lasting and powerful vicious circle was set in motion and
gathered strength, fastly amplifying the complexity of the challenges to be faced by the
country in the following years.
Drafted without minimum consistency guidelines, that the politically crippled executive
branch was unable to press for at that moment, the new constitution failed to endow the
state with a coherent mechanism to protect the interests of the majority of the population
against the multiple pressures of an emerging mass democracy. Instead, it amplified the
scope for the historical widespread rent-seeking behavior of many segments of the
Brazilian society, imposing upon the federal budget a considerable additional burden,
exactly when the Union's fiscal resources were being reduced in favor of state and local
governments, in the wake of a newly introduced but basically inconsistent fiscal
federalism arrangement.
As the new tax system designed in 1988 was phased in during the early nineties, the
central government faced growing financial difficulties. But soon, as could be expected, it
started an unrelenting reaction to evade the pincer movement of shrinking revenues and
swelling expenditures that had been imposed on the Union by new Constitution. And, as
often happens, increasing revenues proved to be much easier than cutting back8
expenditures, especially when a large part of the federal spending could not be reduced
unless politically costly constitutional amendments were duly approved by Congress.
Actually, the Union’s consistent effort to increase its tax revenue – in order both to
recover what had been lost to state and local governments and to be able to properly
finance its much enlarged spending responsibilities – would prove to be a tremendous
success, were it not for a big problem. As the central government devised every kind of
exotic taxation scheme that could raise revenues that would not be shared with lower-
level governments, most of the substantial increase in the federal tax burden achieved
over the last decade stemmed from very low-quality taxes. Most often that meant various
forms of cascading turnover taxes, that back in the mid-sixties seemed to have been
definitely eliminated from the Brazilian tax system.
Table 2.1
Importance of Cascading Taxes
Share of Turnover Taxes in the Total Tax Revenue Managed
 by the Federal Revenue Service
Period
Share of Cascading Taxes 
*
(period average, in percent)





* Includes revenues from IPMF/CPMF, FINSOCIAL/COFINS and PIS/PASEP.
Source: Secretaria da Receita Federal
The figures presented on Table 2.1 are particularly striking. They show the marked
deterioration in the quality of the tax burden imposed by the Union that was observed
since the early nineties, and especially since 1993. The share of the combined revenue of
three cascading taxes in the total tax revenue managed by the Federal Revenue Service9
jumped, from an average of 7.3 percent in 1986-88, to an average of 29.6 percent in 1994-
98, only to jump again to 35.1 percent in 1999. And, based on partial 2000 data, one may
say that the it seems to be heading to 40 percent.
At the state level, distortions of a different kind accumulated over the last three decades.
Part of the difficulties also stemmed from the 1988 Constitution, that granted the states a
much freer hand to introduce changes in their VATs. And as most of the uncoordinated
changes were in fact for the worst, they slowly transformed the pioneering, reasonably
well designed, value-added taxation scheme that had been introduced by the 1967 reform,
into a confusing, disharmonic collection of 27 highly complex state-tax codes, forming an
unmanageable crazy quilt of VAT arrangements.
Though most states are still facing severe fiscal stringency, they have been using their
freer hand in tax matters to fight a fierce fiscal war, competing among themselves to see
which one offers the most generous tax breaks and succeeds in attracting the flashier big
industrial investment projects. The cut-throat competition has been particularly pathetic in
the case the of car plants. And, as a result, the country is lavishly favoring auto makers
with an enormous amount of tax expenditures, just to have something it could probably
get for free.
3 The collective irrationality of that fiscal war has been a source of increasing
resentment among governors, and has come to be perceived by a growing number of them
as the swan song of  the present state-VAT arrangement.
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3. TAX REFORM: PUBLIC OUTCRY AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Tax reform is always bound to be a very controversial issue. But that seems to be
particularly true in today’s Brazil, given the extent of the required changes in the tax
system and the complexity of the country’s fiscal-federalism arrangement. The 1967
reform, that molded a large part of the present tax system, was both designed and
implemented in the shadow of the authoritarian regime that had taken power in 1964. And
though the 1988 reform took place when the military had already walked away, it was
negotiated in a climate of very scarce concern with fiscal consistency. In both 1967 and
1988 therefore, even if for widely different reasons, the real proportions of the conflicts of
interests involved in a tax reform were much less clear than they are now bound to be, as
has been conspicuously shown by the discussion of tax reform issues in the country over
the last few years.
The widespread dissatisfaction with the clumsy and complex way the three levels of
government have been extracting more than 30% of GDP in taxes from the economy has
turned the country into a hotbed of exotic wonder-working tax reform proposals. In fact,
two of those proposals became fairly popular among some segments of the business
community in the mid-nineties. According to one of them, all taxes would be eliminated
and replaced by a single and unique tax on all financial transactions. The other one
envisaged a new system in which all forms of taxation requiring the filing of tax returns
would be replaced by “automatic and easy-to-collect” taxes imposed on financial
transactions and on a short list of goods and services. A list that would include oil,
electricity, telecomm services,  tobacco, beverages and cars.
4
In spite of all the outcry over the tax system, the Cardoso government, that took office in
early 1995, remained too busy to be able to have a clear stance about the tax reform at
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least till late 1997. Of course, lip service continued to be paid to the importance of
carrying on a deep tax reform, as had been defended since the President’s electoral
campaign. But the new government had at first to deal with the difficulties imposed by the
Mexican crisis. And, in fact, during its first months, it was deeply divided on how to react
to the crisis. When it pulled itself together, as the effects of the external turmoil on Brazil
proved to be less strong than anticipated, the Executive was able to extract from Congress
important constitutional reforms that would open the way to the privatization of state-
owned enterprises in mining, telecommunications and electricity-supply industries. But
that proved to be the relatively easy part of the constitutional reform program. Typically,
those reforms involved changing or eliminating a couple of words in the Constitution.
However, there were many other much more complex reforms ahead, as the tax reform,
the social security reform and the public administration reform, which required a detailed
and complex redesign of the existing arrangements. And actually, in 1995, the new
government had no articulate detailed projects for those far more complicated reforms. It
simply did not know what it really wanted from Congress.
1996 should be the year to go ahead with the pending reforms, especially when it became
clear that 1995 had been marked by a very serious deterioration of the public accounts.
But the government would be completely mobilized with something else. The vast
political capital, amassed in the wake of the success of the inflation-fighting program,
would be mainly allocated in extracting from Congress a Constitutional amendment that
would allow the reelection of the president. The Executive played a tough game and
finally got the amendment approved in early 1997. But very precious time was lost, as the
economy was becoming increasingly vulnerable to a less favorable external environment.
The more optimistic analysts believed that, having assured the possibility of being
reelected, and having therefore reinforced its political capital, the President would be
finally ready to press Congress to move forward the required constitutional reform
program. But nothing of the sort happened. Quite to the contrary, in the second quarter of12
1997, the government started to publicly discuss whether the pending reforms were in fact
needed. And even considered the possibility of launching an ambitious public investment
program. But soon the government would be shaken back to reality, with the sudden
change in the international environment caused by the Asian crisis.
In late 1997, hastily preparing an emergency fiscal-adjustment package that had to be
announced in the wake of the external crisis, the federal government decided that it was
about time to show a more active role in the mostly nonsensical debate on tax reform that
was taking place in Congress and within the business community. At an already troubled
moment, the uproar over taxes was bringing much unneeded additional bad press. Though
far from prepared to present something that could resemble a detailed tax-reform
proposal, the government was able to announce a sensible outline of what it considered to
be the required reform.
According to that outline, the envisaged reform should concentrate on straightening out
the way goods and services were taxed in country. The idea was to eliminate all forms of
turnover and cascading taxes, to discard the existing federal tax on manufactured goods,
to dismantle the inconsistent and distorting set of state VATs and to scrap the service tax,
so poorly exploited by local governments.
5 Those taxes would be replaced by three new
ones: a consistent broad-based nationally-managed value-added tax, a new federal excise
tax on a small number of goods and services and a local retail sales tax. A new set of
revenue-sharing and compensation rules would be designed in such way as to preserve
federal, state and local governments from revenue losses.
                                                          
5 It should not only be mentioned but stressed that the government never admitted the possibility of parting with the
federal tax on financial transactions. It was not included among the cascading taxes that would be eliminated.
Distorting as it could certainly be, the tax would be kept with a small rate, it was argued. Being very hard to evade, it
could be a source of invaluable information to tax collectors, in their effort to curb evasion of other taxes, if only
Congress could pass the required legislation allowing tax authorities to have full access to detailed tax revenue data,
compiled by the financial system, that could reveal the annual amount of tax on financial transactions charged to
each tax payer. Such legislation was finally approved by Congress in early December 2000.13
The announcement that, based on such outline, the government was preparing a detailed
tax reform proposal to be eventually submitted to Congress produced a clear turnaround
in the ongoing debate. The government had established a new focal point. During the next
few months the federal tax authorities seemed in fact mobilized by the challenge of
transforming that simple sketch of so far-reaching changes in the tax system into a
minutely consistent and implementable reform project. But such mobilization would soon
lose momentum. The fiscal-adjustment package that had been announced in late 1997 had
given the economy some leeway to face the shock waves of the worst part of the Asian
crisis. But, in the second quarter of 1998, as soon as the external environment became less
unfavorable again, the government proved to be confident enough to suspend a sizable
part of the fiscal-adjustment measures it had so hastily announced some months before. In
the wake of that fallback, the urgency that seemed to have been assigned to the tax reform
disappeared. Top priority was attributed to assuring victory in the coming presidential
election.
It was not a very wise move. A few months after, in August 1998, but still two months
before the election, the Brazilian economy would be caught in a very vulnerable position
by the shock wave of the Russian crisis. This time it was a major shock wave, but the
adoption of all relevant reacting measures had to wait for the election. When the measures
were finally adopted, tough as they were, given the circumstances, they proved to be far
from enough to prevent the economy from plunging in the serious foreign-exchange crisis
of early 1999.
But the most traumatic part of the crisis was soon over. Restoration of confidence was fast
and the overshooting of the exchange rate was surprisingly short-lived. By mid-1999, it
was already perfectly clear that the impact of the devaluation would be much less costly
than anticipated, both in terms of the inflationary shock and in terms of the initial
depressing effects on the level of activity. In March, the government itself had announced
that it was expecting a contraction of 3.5 to 4 percent in the level of activity in 1999. It14
was certainly a happy surprise after all that such troubled year brought no fall at all in
GDP, but a positive growth rate of almost 1 percent.
But short as it was, the scaring experience of the foreign-exchange crisis of early 1999
seems to have inoculated a surprising degree of conviction on the re-elected government
about the need to maintain and consolidate the fiscal-adjustment measures adopted since
the Russian crisis. However, in what concerns the tax reform, the government emerged
from the crisis extremely skeptical about the possibility of going ahead with the proposal
outlined in late 1997. In a landmark interview to a major newspaper in mid-March 1999
the President was particularly candid on the matter, leaving no doubts whatsoever about
how he was assessing the odds. He simply said that the tax reform was too complex and
that he thought the country still “lacked the required consciousness” of the involved
issues and interests. Pushing the reform forward would simply paralyze the parliament, so
heavy were the required political negotiations.
6
Crystal-clear as that position may have seem, it would soon prove be politically
untenable. Having put off the tax reform for his whole first term in office, the President
suddenly found out that there was no political room left for explicitly putting off the
reform for still another term. After all, if the tax reform was considered to be too complex
to be negotiated in Congress when the President was just beginning its second term, it was
hard to believe that it would be seen as an easier task in 2000, when the local elections
campaign would naturally lead to a much hotter discussion of the involved issues. And, of
course, it was even harder to believe that the reform would be perceived as a simpler
challenge during the second half of the presidential term, when congressmen and
governors would be involved in a complex redeployment of political forces, in
preparation for the general elections of 2002. Postponing the reform to a more convenient
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moment would therefore almost certainly mean to leave the whole issue for the next
presidential term.
In Congress, it was immediately perceived that the President’s position was in fact
untenable. Given the unyielding public outcry over the inadequacy of the tax system, it
would be very difficult to continue to evade the whole issue, particularly in such an overt
manner. Almost simultaneously, the presiding officers of both the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies made incisive declarations to the media, disagreeing with the
President’s stance and strongly stressing how urgent they thought a tax reform really was.
Given the impending possibility of losing initiative in such an important matter to
Congress, the Executive was forced to back off and to declare that the reform was in fact
a top priority issue. Having been obviously dragged to a battle it would rather evade, and
worse, in the uncomfortable position of follower of the Congress, the Executive seemed
in late March 1999 not only unprepared for the coming action in this area but also
dangerously tempted to resort to improvisation.
7
But, with the benefit of hindsight, one may say that, from then on, the government would
deal with the tax reform as if it had decided to follow a different course of action. More
precisely, perhaps one should say, a course of inaction. That does not mean at all that
nothing happened. In fact, over the following eighteen months the tax-reform issue would
involve a convoluted and far from uneventful game between Congress and the Executive.
However, at the end of that game, the latter’s strategy proved to had simply focused on a
firm adherence to the stance the President had so clearly expressed before having been
forced, back in March 1999, to unwillingly play such a game with Congress.
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Though the end of the that meandering story is somewhat melancholic, its thread certainly
deserves attention.  A tax reform with a scope as wide as outlined by the Executive in late
1997 involves a very delicate operation in which a substantial part of the tax system is
replaced by a new one. In principle, that should be done in such a way was to assure that
the adopted changes form a new viable, organic and consistent arrangement. A brand-new
incongruous patchwork may end up being even worse than the present arrangement,
deplorable as it undeniably is. To avoid that kind of botched outcome, the Executive has
to be able to negotiate with Congress the reform as whole. That does not mean that the
basic proposal should be seen as immutable. It may well be extensively modified in
Congress. But changes have to be introduced in such a way as to preserve the reform’s
consistency.
That only stresses how complex the required negotiations are. It is no easy task. But there
seems to be little hope of success, if the Executive is not able to start the whole political
bargaining process from a very clear and convincing basic proposal. That is exactly what
the late 1997 outline seemed to be. And the essence of that outline was even revived in
October 1999, when the Executive announced a somewhat different tax-reform proposal.
In what concerns taxes to be eliminated there was not any major novelty. The difference
was in the taxes to be created. The 1997 idea of a loosely defined “nationally managed”
VAT was turned into a plain federal VAT with a clearly established revenue-sharing
scheme with state and local governments. And the new federal excise tax on goods and
services proposed in 1997 was converted into a new state excise tax.
The clear-cut definition of the proposed VAT as a federal tax triggered immediate strong
opposition to the government’s new proposal in Congress and among state governors.
Such fierce resistance turned the government even more skeptical about the possibility of
going ahead with a consistent tax reform. And since then the Executive has been trying to
dissociate itself from the kind of reform that it had outlined in late 1997 and, again, in late
1999. In fact, that withdrawal was far from easy, because the essence of proposal that the17
government was trying to abandon was in the meantime being adopted by Congress.
Ironically as it might be, in March 2000, the Chamber of Deputies’ Special Committee for
Tax Reform approved a proposal that in many ways resembled what seemed to have been
initially envisaged by the Executive.
In agreement with the main idea that pervaded the 1997 outline, the Special Committee
proposed the elimination of all forms of turnover and cascading taxes, the discarding of
the existing federal tax on manufactured goods, the dismantling of the inconsistent set of
state VATs and the scrapping of the service tax charged by local governments. According
to the proposal approved by the Committee, the combined revenue generated by all those
taxes would be raised by a new broad-based dual VAT – involving the supposedly
harmonic coexistence of separate federal and state value-added taxes – and a new
municipal retail sales tax.
8
As a matter a fact, a variant of that proposal, defended by the Special Committee’s
rapporteur, but not voted by the Committee, also gained some importance in the recent tax
reform debate.
9 In the proposed alternative, the dual VAT would only be required to
generate enough revenue to compensate the combined revenue that would be lost with the
elimination of the existing federal tax on manufactured goods, the state VAT and the
local-government service tax. The remaining and substantial revenue loss, that would
stem from the elimination of all turnover and cascading taxes, would be recouped by a
new loosely defined “non-cumulative” tax on goods and services.
10
Confronted with those two proposals, the government did not hide its strong resistance to
both of them. And at the end of a noisy five-month long public quarrel over the reform, in
which state governors played a key role, the Executive announced that still another
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proposal would be submitted to Congress. But when the proposal was finally disclosed in
early August 2000, it was found out that the Executive had abandoned altogether the
original idea of eliminating turnover and cascading taxes. And the main proposed change,
a new destinaton-based VAT, still imposed by the states, but under nationally uniformed
rules, was fiercely objected by some governors. A few days later, the presiding officer of
the Chamber of Deputies, supported by all party leaders, simply declared that the proposal
had been considered a nonstarter, as it failed to address the main tax-reform issues. After
almost three years, negotiations had ended in deadlock. But the Executive did not seem to
be particularly disappointed.19
4. Unriddling the Deadlock: A Partial Assessment of the Difficulties
Looking back to what has happened since late 1997, one may be tempted to explain the
tax-reform deadlock resorting to the usual handy argument: lack of required political will
in Brasília. And President Cardoso’s penchant for procrastination during his first term in
office makes jumping to such conclusion even more tempting. But doing so would mean
to evade a deeper understanding of the difficulties and uncertainties which turn the idea of
implementing a sound tax reform in Brazil today into a challenge of extreme complexity.
Of course, one may always say that, confronted with such challenge, the government
simply shied away. But even being that partly true, it is still interesting to find out in more
detail why the tax-reform challenge has come to be perceived as some kind of Herculean
task in Brasilia.
Table 4.1 allows a comparison of the main features of the five tax-reform proposals
defended in the country since 1997, as discussed in section 3. Except for the last proposal,
which seems to have been somewhat designed to bring down the curtain, all the other four
have important common elements. They seem to share the same basic diagnosis on what
is wrong with indirect taxation in the country. They are strikingly similar in what
concerns taxes to be eliminated. And are not so dissimilar in what concerns taxes to be
created. Considering that two of those proposals stemmed from the Executive and two
from Congress, that seems to point out to a surprising degree of agreement on the main
line of the required reform.
The guiding idea is the reconstruction of value-added taxation on broader and more
rational  grounds, in such a way as to allow the elimination of the turnover and cascading
taxes that have gained so much importance over the last decade. The big question is how
that switching of tax base should be brought about. The involved difficulties are certainly20
Table 4.1
Tax-Reform Proposals
Comparison of Main Features
Proposal Taxes to be eliminated Taxes to be created
Executive’s Late 1997 Proposal
October 1997
All turnover and cascading taxes
(Cofins, PIS-Pasep),
except tax on financial transactions
Federal tax on manufactured products
(IPI)
State VAT (ICMS)
Service tax charged by local
governments (ISS)
Nationally-managed VAT
Federal excise tax on goods and services
Retail sales tax (IVV)
Executive’s Late 1999 Proposal
October 1999
All turnover and cascading taxes
(Cofins, PIS-Pasep),
except tax on financial transactions
Federal tax on manufactured products
(IPI)
State VAT (ICMS)
Service tax charged by local
governments (ISS)
Federal VAT
State excise tax on goods and services
Municipal retail sales tax (IVV)
Special Committee’s Proposal
March 2000
All turnover and cascading taxes
(Cofins, PIS-Pasep, CPMF)
Federal tax on manufactured products
(IPI)
State VAT (ICMS)
Service tax charged by local
governments (ISS)
Dual VAT
(coexisting federal and state VATs)
Municipal retail sales tax (IVV)
Non-voted Rapporteurs’s Proposal
March 2000
All turnover and cascading taxes
(Cofins, PIS-Pasep, CPMF)
Federal tax on manufactured products
(IPI)
State VAT (ICMS)
Service tax charged by local
governments (ISS)
Dual VAT




Federal tax on manufactured products
(IPI)
State VAT (ICMS)
Service tax charged by local
governments (ISS)
Federal tax on goods and services
(IBS)
Nationally uniformed state VAT
Municipal retail sales tax (IVV)21
amplified by the complexity of the Brazilian fiscal federalism, especially because value-
added taxation has traditionally been the mainstay of revenue at the state level. But,
without trying in any way to underestimate the involved fiscal-federalism problems, it
may be worth postponing the discussion of those difficulties to section 7. And to
concentrate first on problems of a different kind that seems to have received less
attention, but that will have to be duly faced by a tax reform that follows the common line
pervading the first four proposals of Table 4.1.
In principle, the reform should be implemented in such a way as to avoid any loss of
aggregate tax revenue, no matter how the revenue is shared among the three levels of
government. It is therefore easy to conclude that it will only be possible to part with the
cascading taxes, and the substantial revenue that has been raised by them, if the new
value-added taxation scheme is able to generate a revenue far greater than the combined
revenue which today stems from the state VAT (ICMS), the federal tax on manufactured
goods (IPI) and the service tax imposed by local governments (ISS). In 1999, as shown in
Table 4.2, the total revenue generated by those three taxes reached R$ 88.9 billion (9.2
percent of GDP). The new value-added taxation scheme should be able to raise much
more than that in order to allow the removal of the turnover taxes. Even if one leaves
aside the tax on financial transactions (CPMF), that the federal government insists in not
parting with, one has to have in mind that the remaining turnover taxes (COFINS and
PIS-PASEP) raised R$ 42 billion (4.4 percent of GDP) in 1999. Therefore, the new set of
taxes introduced by the reform should be able to generate a total revenue of R$ 130.9
billion, corresponding to 13.6 percent of GDP. As may be also seen in the bottom line of
the same table, that revenue target has been moving up very rapidly, in the wake of the
growing importance of federal cascading taxes. In 1997, it corresponded to only 12.4
percent of GDP.
Raising such impressive revenue will require a really broad-based value-added taxation
scheme. Though, in principle, there is no problem in devising a legal definition of the22
VAT base as broad as possible, there should not be any doubt about the intensity of the
opposition such proposal will have to face in Congress. The existing base of the current
state VAT (ICMS) would have to be substantially broadened, particularly in such a way
as to include most services, so far basically sheltered from explicit taxation. That kind of
change is bound to meet strong resistance in Congress. On the other hand, the broadening
of the value-added tax base may as well require a heavier taxation of a considerable
number of goods and services, whose consumption has been usually classified as either
essential or meritorious. And that will also spurt serious opposition in Congress.
Table 4.2















COFINS (Federal turnover tax)   19.1 2.2 32.2 3.4
PIS-PASEP (Federal turnover tax)    7.6 0.9   9.8 1.0
IPI (Federal tax on manufactured goods) 16.8 1.9 16.5 1.7
ICMS (State value-added tax) 59.6 6.8 67.7 7.0
ISS (Service tax imposed by local governments)  4.8 0.5  4.7 0.5
Total 107.9 12.4 130.9 13.6
Any tax reform proposal strengthening the importance of value-added taxation should
therefore take into account the powerful coalition that, in many different ways, will be
pressing for the erosion of the potential base of the new tax. The resulting political
pressure could easily push the reform to an unreasonably high required VAT rate. One
has also to have in mind that, no matter how broad the legal tax base that may be
eventually extracted from Congress, there is still uncertainty about the extent to which
such base will be effectively exploited, given the limitations of the tax-collecting23
apparatus. Actually, there is a well known two-way relationship to be taken into account.
On one hand, the VAT base has to be broad enough in order to allow the required tax rate
to be reasonably low. On the other, with a high VAT rate, it will be unwise to count on an
effective broad base, even if, legally, the base seems to be broadly defined.24
5. A SIMPLE CONSISTENCY MODEL
From an aggregate point of view, the first four reform proposals outlined in table 4.1, that
have so much in common, could be seen as special cases of a more general proposal that
could be “stylized” as follows. All taxes listed in table 4.2 (COFINS, PIS-PASEP, IPI,
ICMS and ISS) would be eliminated. Their combined revenue would be generated by
three new taxes: a value-added tax, an excise tax and a retail sales tax. The differences
among the four proposals have mostly to do with the design of the value-added taxation
scheme and the excise tax. And there is no doubt that, from the viewpoint of fiscal-
federalism, those are certainly very big differences. But not as big when seen from an
aggregate perspective. And if one sticks to that perspective -- for a while, at least -- the
“stylized” proposal just outlined may be very useful, since it allows a clearer discussion
of some the consistency problems which have to be taken into account.
The involved problems may be analyzed with a simple consistency model.
11 The starting
point is the constraint that the total revenue will be preserved. The new taxes would have
to be able to generate as much revenue as is being generated by the taxes that are to be
removed. Being such combined revenue given by R, defined as
R = ICMS + IPI + ISS + COFINS + PIS/PASEP          [1]
the total-revenue preservation constraint may be written as
EXC + VAT + ST = R          [2]
where EXC, VAT e ST are, respectively, the revenues stemming from the excise tax, the
value-added tax, and the retail sales tax.
                                                          
11 The model is a new updated version of one that has been previously developed to analyze the 1997 proposal in
Werneck (2000).25
There is also a whole set of constraints that simply assure the preservation of the revenue
of each level of government. The shares RUA, REA, and RMA, that the Union, the states
and the municipalities currently have in total revenue R, would be kept unchanged (the
letter A intending to mean actual). One may therefore write
RU = RUA          [3a]
RE = REA          [3b]
RM = RMA          [3c]
And, of course,
RU + RE + RM = R = RUA + REA + RMA          [4]
Another set of constraints has to do with the preservation of each state’s revenue. If one
writes the current combined share REA of all states in R as the sum of each state’s share,
REA = S REAj          [5]
preserving every state from revenue loss means to require
REj = REAj           [6]
for every j.
The excise-tax revenue EXC depends on the tax’s potential base BEXC , on the degree of
effective exploitation of that base, measured by the coefficient aEXC , and on the average
rate tEXC  of that tax. One may simply write26
EXC = tEXC aEXC BEXC          [7]
where, of course,
0 < aEXC < 1          [8]
Analogously, the VAT revenue may be written as
VAT = tVAT aVAT BVAT          [9]
where BVAT is the potential tax base, tVAT the tax rate and aVAT the base exploitation
coefficient, also measured by a positive number smaller than 1.
For the sake of simplicity, the retail sales tax is assumed to be the same within each state.
It could be either imposed by the state and shared with municipalities or directly collected
by local governments. Both arrangements are consistent with writing the sales-tax
revenue in state j as
STj = tj aj (1+ tVAT) aVAT BVAT j          [10]
The tax would be imposed on the gross value of final goods or services, including the
VAT. If BVAT j is the VAT potential base in state j , the sales-tax potential base would be
the effective VAT base, aVAT BVAT j , multiplied by (1+ tVAT). The degree of effective
exploitation of that base in state j is denoted by aj and the local sales-tax rate by tj.
The total sales-tax revenue, raised in all states, would be given by
ST = S [tj aj (1+ tVAT) aVAT BVAT j]          [11]27
an expression that may be rewritten as
IVV = aVAT BVAT S tj aj (1+ tVAT) bVAT j          [12]
where
bVAT j = BVAT j / BVAT          [13]
is the share of state j in the VAT’s potential base. Of course,
S bVAT j = 1          [14]
Assuming that both the excise tax and the VAT were collected by the Union, the revenue
of state j would be given by
REj = (1- mj ) STj + TRj           [15]
where mj is the proportion of the retail sales-tax revenue that state j passes through to its
municipalities, and TRj is the amount received by state j in the revenue-sharing
arrangement involving the VAT and the excise tax. That equation can be easily altered in
many ways to accommodate a number of different arrangements in the reform. If the
VAT and the excise tax are assumed to be partly imposed by the states, as envisaged in
some of the proposals, the right-hand side of the equation has to be properly rewritten in
such a way as to include a term corresponding to the additional revenue state j would be
directly collecting. On the other hand, to presume that the retail sales tax is to be wholly
collected by local governments corresponds to assuming mj = 1 in equation [15].
However, some of the most important aggregate consistency issues involved in the reform
do not seem to be very much affected by changes in assumptions concerning the tax-28
collecting roles of the three levels of government, no matter how important those
assumptions certainly are from the point of view of fiscal federalism.
The total value of revenue-sharing pass-through  received by the states may be written as
TR = S TRj          [16]
and the total revenue stemming from the tree new taxes that, either directly or indirectly,
would be channeled to the states would be given by
RE = S REj          [17]
Analogously, the revenue municipal governments would be getting from the three taxes
could be written as
RM = S mj STj + TRM          [18]
where the sum on the right-hand side is the municipalities’ share in the total sales-tax
revenue and TRM is the amount received by local governments in the revenue-sharing
arrangement involving the VAT and the excise tax.
Once the model has been described, equations [7], [9] and [11] may be substituted into
equation [2], allowing the total-revenue preservation constraint to be rewritten as
tEXC aEXC BEXC + tVAT aVAT BVAT  + aVAT  BVAT S tj aj (1+ tVAT) bVAT j = R          [19]
That is the main equation of the consistency model. In principle, there is an infinity of
combinations of values of the involved variables that should make the total amount of the
three collected taxes equal to the required revenue R. One has to choose which will be the29
adjusting variable. The obvious choice seems to be the rate tVAT , given the fundamental
role played by the VAT among the newly created taxes. Solving the equation above for
tVAT , one may write
                                     R - tEXC aEXC BEXC - aVAT BVAT S tj aj bVAT j
tVAT
* = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––          [20]
                                           aVAT BVAT (1 +S tj aj bVAT )
For each set of values attributed to parameters and variables that appear in the right-hand
side of the expression, one gets the corresponding value-added tax rate tIVA
* that is
required to generate the total revenue R.
Once the required rate tIVA
* has been determined, one may establish how the total revenue
will have to be redistributed in such a way as to preserve all government spheres and all
states from revenue losses. Substituting equation [10] in [15], using [13] and the
constraint established by [6] and, finally, plugging tIVA
* in the resulting equation one may
obtain
TRj = REAj - (1- mj ) tj aj (1+ tVAT
*) b VAT j aVAT BVAT        [21]
that determines the pass-through of federal revenue that is required preserve the revenue
of state j.
The substitution of that expression in equation [16] leads to
TR = S REAj - (1+ tVAT
*) aVAT BIVA S (1 - mj ) tj aj bVAT j           [22]
that determines the total federal pass-throughs received by the states due to the revenue-
sharing of the value-added tax and the excise tax.30
Similarly, the substitution of equation [10] in [18] and the use of equation [13] and of the
constraint established by equation [3c] leads to
TRM = RMA - aVAT BVAT S mj tj aj (1+ tVAT
*) bVAT j          [23]
that determines the total federal pass-throughs to municipalities which is required to
preserve the revenue of the local governments.31
6. SIMULATIONS AND REFORM UNCERTAINTY
Inserting plausible values for parameters and exogenous variables, one may use the model
for simulation exercises. A full exploitation of the model’s possibilities may be found in
Werneck (2000), that analyzes the late 1997 tax-reform proposal, based on data available
in early 1998. In this section, the model will be used in a much more limited way, just to
shed some light, from an aggregate point of view, at difficulties and uncertainties
involved in the “stylized” reform proposal depicted in the beginning of last section.
The value and decomposition of the total revenue that stemmed, in 1999, from the taxes
that are supposed to be eliminated are presented in Table 6.1. In the same table, one may
also see the involved revenue-sharing pass-throughs, as well as the resulting final
distribution of resources among the three government-levels, shown on the right-hand
side column. It is from this column that one may obtain the values that should be
attributed to the exogenous variables RUA, REA and RMA, that appear in equations [3] to
[6].    
The value of the variable BVAT , that measures the potential base of the value-added tax,
deserves a close attention. What has been envisaged – in fact, by all reform-proposals
presented in Table 4.1 – is a destination-based consumption-type VAT. Aggregate
consumption in 1999 has probably topped R$ 600 billion.
12 But that estimate supposedly
includes indirect taxes on consumption, whereas the model assumes a tax-exclusive VAT
rate. On the other hand, the official national-accounts GDP figure probably
underestimates the true value of the aggregate output by a considerable margin. And,
having in mind the residual treatment given to consumption in the national accounts, it is
                                                          
12 Estimate based on the available detailed 1998 national accounts and the recently published preliminary estimate of
the 1999 nominal GDP,  assuming that aggregate personal consumption remained constant as a proportion of GDP.32
reasonable to assume that a disproportional part of the GDP underestimation falls upon
aggregate consumption.
Table 6.1
Total Revenue from Taxes to be Eliminated and Revenue-Sharing Pass-Through
1999















Union 58.5 -7.8   50.7
   IPI 16.5
   COFINS 32.2
   PIS/PASEP   9.8
States 67.7 4.1 -16.9   54.9
   ICMS 67.7
Municipalities   4.7 3.7 16,9   25.3
    ISS   4.7
Total      130.9       130.9
Source: Secretaria da Receita Federal
All qualifications being taken into account, the R$ 600 billion figure was considered an
acceptable upper bound for the potential VAT base. But roughly a fifth of that
corresponds to residential housing services and it is hard to believe that it will be
politically feasible to define a VAT base broad enough to embrace explicit and implicit
residential rents. Again, that only stresses the need to have in mind the possibility of
having an effective VAT base much narrower than the potential one, as was underlined in
section 4. And that is why the coefficient aVAT , that gauges the broadness of the base in
the model, is bound to have such a crucial importance in the simulations.33
Before considering more elaborate simulation exercises, it may be useful to establish a
basic benchmark asking a very simple question. What would be the required VAT tax
rate, if the total revenue now stemming from the taxes that are to be eliminated were to be
entirely generated by the VAT ? In the model, that would correspond to a special case in
which the excise tax rate tEXC and all sales-tax rates tj are assumed to be zero. Under those
assumptions, equation [20]
                                 R - tEXC aEXC BEXC - aVAT BVAT S tj aj bVAT j
tVAT
* = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––                    [20]
                                         aVAT BVAT (1 +S tj aj bVAT )
would become a much simpler expression
                                                                    R
tVAT
* = ––––––––––––––            [24]
                                                             aVAT BVAT
that leads to a very straightforward back-of-an-envelope calculation. If one
overoptimistically assumes the aVAT  coefficient to be equal to 1 and, therefore, the
effective VAT base to coincide with the potential R$ 600 billion base, the VAT rate
would have to be equal to approximately 21.8 percent in order to generate the R$ 130.9
billion, currently collected by the taxes that are to be eliminated. Allowing for the
narrowing of the tax base that would stem from the exclusion of residential housing
services would mean to assume aVAT  to be roughly equal to 0.8, instead of 1. Under that
assumption, the required VAT rate would leap to around 27.3 percent. Of course, an even
narrower tax base, as could be reasonably expected, would lead to quite immoderate rates,
as may be seen in Figure 6.1.
13
                                                          
13 The average revenue productivity of the value-added tax is defined as the revenue, as percent of GDP, generated
by each percentage point of the nominal tax rate. Among Latin American countries, Chile, with 0.5, has the highest
VAT revenue productivity. A tax rate of 18 percent allows the collection of 9 percent of GDP in revenue. It is
curious to notice that, if the new Brazilian VAT could attain such a high productivity, the generation of a revenue34
The possibility of exorbitant rates being after all required calls attention to a logic pitfall
that may be involved in treating the effective broadness of the VAT base, measured by
aVAT , as an exogenous variable, independent of the tax rate. Given a legal definition of
how broad the base is supposed to be and the degree of efficacy that may be expected
from the tax collecting apparatus, it may be far more reasonable to assume that the
effective broadness of the base depends on how high is the imposed VAT rate. The higher
the tax rate, the stronger the evasion incentives and the narrower the effective base.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
corresponding to 13.6 percent of GDP would require a rate of 27.2 percent, which is strikingly close to the rate
calculated above. See Tanzi (2000) for recent data on VAT productivity in Latin America.
Figure 6.1
Required VAT Rate for Different Values of the Base-Broadness Coefficient aVAT
Benchmark Case: Revenue of All Eliminated Taxes Entirely Generated by the VAT
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One could incorporate that assumption in the model supposing that the effective
broadness of the VAT base may be written as
h = h(aVAT ,tVAT ,v)          [25]
a constant-elasticity function that simply corrects the legally determined value of aVAT
taking into account the tax rate tVAT and the elasticity v. So far, the model was implicitly
assuming that v was simply equal to zero. That means, for example, that if the legally
defined base broadness corresponded to 70% of the potential base, one could supposedly
count on such broadness, no matter how high the tax rate is. Undoubtedly, a very
unrealistic assumption.
When equation [29] is introduced in the model, equation [9], that establishes the VAT revenue,
has to be rewritten as
VAT = tVAT  h(aVAT ,tVAT ,v) BVAT          [26]
And that means that the total-revenue preservation constraint, given by equation [19], has
also to be rewritten, as
tEXC aEXC BEXC + tVAT h(aVAT ,tVAT ,v)BVAT + h(aVAT ,tVAT ,v)BVAT S tj aj(1+ tVAT)bVAT j = R    [27]
Attributing plausible values to parameters and exogenous variables, one may obtain the
required VAT rate as the root of the above equation.
According to that equation, what would the required VAT tax rate be, if the total revenue
now stemming from the taxes that are to be eliminated were to be entirely generated by
the VAT? As before, the question involves a special case in which the excise tax rate tEXC
and all sales-tax rates tj are assumed to be zero in equation [27]. Under those extreme
assumptions, that equation simply become36
tVAT  h(aVAT ,tVAT ,v)BVAT  = R    [27]
Assuming again the potential base BVAT to be R$ 600 billion, one may attribute different
sets of values to aVAT and to the elasticity v, and obtain for each of those sets, the
corresponding root value that determines the required VAT tax rate tVAT
*. Results of such
simulations are presented in Figure 6.2, for different values of aVAT and v.
When the elasticity is assumed to be zero, one gets the lowest curve, which is identical to
the one shown in Figure 6.1. The other three curves of Figure 6.2 were obtained by
making v equal to 0.1, 0.25 and 0.33, respectively. It may be seen that, as one makes more
Figure 6.2
Required VAT Rate
for Different Values of the Base-Broadness Coefficient aVAT and the Elasticity v
Benchmark Case: Total Revenue of Eliminated Taxes Entirely Generated by the VAT
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pessimistic assumptions on the base narrowing that may stem from increasing the tax rate,
the involved trade-off between base broadness and the required rate becomes
considerably more adverse.
To what extent could the trade-off be eased by bringing back the excise tax and the retail
sales tax to the scene? As a matter of fact, it is hard to see how the retail sales tax could
help much, at least from an aggregate viewpoint. The idea of introducing a sales tax has
basically stemmed  from fiscal-federalism concerns. It is much more a form of giving the
lower-level governments a tax revenue to collect than an attempt to ease the pressure on
value-added taxation. In fact, as the sales tax and the VAT constitute a rather odd
combination, there has even been a proposal of reducing the oddness by piggybacking the
retail sales tax onto the VAT. State or municipalities would collect an additional
percentage on top of the VAT rate. Even if such solution is not adopted, one should not
miss the point that the sales tax, as have been envisaged in the various reform proposals,
seems to be simply a way to redistribute the power to tax the VAT base within the
federation.
14
Would the excise tax do the trick? Of course, it all depends on how much revenue could
be expected from it. As a matter of fact, all tax-reform proposals that envisaged the
creation of an excise tax, collected either at federal or state level, were marked by a rather
loose definition of what would be the tax base. And much looser yet in what concerns tax
rates and revenue to be expected. But in the discussion of the late 1997 proposal, a
reasonable estimate of the value that could be raised by the excise tax was considered to
be between 2 and 2.5 percent of GDP. In 1999, that meant something on the order of R$
20 to R$ 25 billion. Even if one takes the upper limit, there would still be a revenue of R$
105.9 billion left to be generated by the VAT-cum-sales-tax arrangement, if the R$ 130.9
billion target were to be reached.
                                                          
14 It goes without saying that the same point becomes much more forceful yet in the case of a dual VAT arrangement.38
How much lower would the required VAT tax rate be? In order to answer that question,
the simulations that led to the results presented on Figure 6.2 above were repeated, under
the assumption that the targeted value-added tax revenue was only R$105.9 billion. The
results are presented in Figure 6.3, for different values of aVAT and v.
If aVAT could be made equal to 1, the R$ 25 billion of excise-tax revenue would allow a
reduction in the required VAT rate from 21.8 percent, as was shown in Figure 6.2, to 17.7
percent, as may be seen in Figure 6.3. Roughly, it would take R$ 6 billion of excise-tax
revenue for each percentage point of reduction in the required VAT rate. But as one
Figure 6.3
Required VAT Rate
for Different Values of the Base-Broadness Coefficient aVAT and the Elasticity v
Total Revenue of Eliminated Taxes Generated by the VAT,
Complemented by R$ 25 billion of Excise-Tax Revenue
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attributes lower and more realistic values to aVAT , assuming a narrower effective base, the
required VAT rate increases very fast. For aVAT equal to 0.7, the required rate would lie
between 25 and 30 percent, depending on which value is attributed to the elasticity v, in a
range that goes from zero to 0.33. It should be noticed however, that the narrower the
effective VAT base, the stronger the sensitivity of the required VAT rate to an increase in
the excise tax revenue.
15 When aVAT is made equal to 0.7 and the elasticity v is assumed to
be zero, it takes only R$ 4.2 billion of excise-tax revenue to reduce the required VAT rate
in one percentage point, from roughly 25 to 24 percent. And when aVAT is kept at 0.7, but
the elasticity is assumed to be 0.33, it takes much less. Only R$ 2.4 billion. But the rate
reduction is from approximately 30 to 29 percent.
The big question is how broad could be the VAT tax base finally extracted from
Congress. As seen above, about a fifth of the potential base corresponds to residential
housing services. And, as discussed in section 4, Congress is bound to show great
resistance to the inclusion of such services in the base and, also, to broadening the base as
much as needed in order to let it embrace most other services. Moreover, arguments based
on the on the idea of labeling the consumption of certain goods and services as either
essential or meritorious should bring additional erosion to the tax base finally approved
by Congress. All things considered, in the end the feasible base may be excessively
narrow and require an unreasonably high VAT rate. One may see, therefore, that there are
considerable political and legislative risks to be taken into account, even if the involved
difficulties are merely seen from an aggregate point of view.
16 Those risks are much
amplified however when the difficulties that stem from fiscal federalism are brought to
the scene.
                                                          
15 That may be easily checked in equation [24], that implicitly assumes the elasticity v to be zero. In that equation,
the derivative of the required VAT rate with respect to R increases when aVAT decreases.
16 See Werneck (2000), for an attempt to take those risks into account in the evaluation of the late 1997 proposal,
using an analytical framework based on Monte Carlo simulations.40
7.  The Fiscal-Federalism Conundrum
It is impossible to fully understand the present deadlock in the tax-reform negotiations
without having in mind the complexity of the Brazilian fiscal federalism. And if there is
any hope of breaking the deadlock, that task is bound to require a much clearer analysis of
interests, apprehensions, reasons and motivations of the main involved actors. Today,
there is nobody in the country that seems to be satisfied with the present tax system.
Cutting across the whole political spectrum in Congress, there is an impressive consensus
on the urgent need of a bold reform. But, as often happens, the consensus disappears as
soon as the generic idea of the reform is left behind and the discussion starts to be a bit
more detailed.
As seen in the previous sections, the main line of the reform-proposals that have been
discussed since 1997, involves a deep change in the way goods and services are taxed in
the country. What has been envisaged is a reconstruction of value-added taxation on
broader and more rational grounds, in such a way as to allow the elimination of the
turnover and cascading taxes that have gained so much importance over the last decade.
But, as the combined revenue raised by taxes to be eliminated corresponds to 13.6 percent
of GDP, that means a gigantic operation of extraordinary complexity and full of all kinds
of uncertainties. Particularly when seen from the point of view of fiscal federalism.
Since the late 1997 proposal, the federal government was careful enough to assure that
there was no intention of imposing any kind of loss to any of the three government tiers.
Neither the Union, nor any state or municipality would have to cope with shrinking fiscal
resources. Commendable as that stated intention certainly was, it is widely known that in
a reform of such scope it is practically impossible to prevent significant losses. Though it
has been proposed that resources from a national compensation fund would be available
to offset any losses, potential losers thought they had good reasons to be skeptical about
the possibility of relying on the promised compensation scheme.41
As seen, in section 3, such skepticism lend force to proposals of abandoning the idea of a
nationally managed VAT and adopting instead a dual VAT, involving the harmonic
coexistence of separate but integrated federal and a state value-added taxes. That was the
distinctive mark of the third and fourth proposals listed in Table 4.1.
17 But the federal
government has remained unconvinced about the dual VAT arrangement.
18
As the three levels of government have been engaged for a long time in a very wearisome
fiscal-adjustment effort, uneasiness about the possibility of losing revenue has become
quite exacerbated. Initially, when the first reform proposal was outlined in 1997,
apprehension with possible losses imposed by the reform was basically found among
governors and mayors. More recently, however, the federal government itself started to
show its own misgivings, fearing that the reform could in someway revert the spectacular
increase in federal tax revenue observed since 1993, putting in jeopardy the consolidation
of the whole stabilization effort.
The tax reform debate has become a noisy clash of conflicting views, increasingly marked
by strong risk aversion towards revenue losses. There is fear on all sides. Initially agreed
compensation rules might not be respected and could be altered in the future. The tax base
of the new VAT might have a totally different regional distribution, as the current origin-
based value-added tax is converted into a destination-based one. The total revenue
collected might shrink. Introducing radical changes in consolidated tax legislation might
open the way for an unending litigations. For whatever reason, there could be revenue
losses.
                                                          
17 See again Afonso, Araújo, Rezende and Varsano (2000).
18 A full analysis of the possibilities of the dual VAT arrangement goes beyond the scope of the present paper. See
Varsano (1995 and 1999), Bird (1999), Bird and Gendron (1997), Keen (1999) and McLure (1999a and 1999b).42
Though there is an increasingly clear perception that the “fiscal war” among states is
leading to nowhere, governors fear a tax reform might tie their hands and put an end to
using tax breaks to attract industrial investors. Also, governors of states situated in
regions currently benefited by federal tax incentives fear that a reform might mean the
final wiping out of those privileges.
As all those apprehensions interact, the result has been an escalating non-cooperative
game, marked by increasing mistrust. A game that seems to have pushed some of the
involved parts to totally unreasonable positions. Federal tax authorities started to heartily
defend the idea that cascading taxes are not so bad after all. And at the state level, some
governors seem so entrenched to the point of defending, as something sacred, their right
to continue to impose on some services, as telecommunications, a 40 percent state-VAT.
Even if there were a cooperative game within the federation, the reform would still be a
rather complex operation. And, of course, such complexity has been much amplified by
the conflicted way the reform has been discussed. As the difficult negotiations have been
dragging for years, relationships between some key interlocutors have become obviously
overstrained. And some of the contending positions are becoming unreasonably
crystallized.
Given the undeniable urgency of the reform, it is important to know how to start again,
from scratch, if needed. There is no possible justification for prolonging the brutally
irrational way the three levels of government have been extracting 32 percent of GDP in
taxes from the economy. The powerful tax-policy mobilization that was required to stage
the stabilization battle has now to be reverted, opening the way to less primitive taxation
forms, that may enhance competitiveness and economic growth. And, still in the first half
of the current presidential term, there is no sense in putting off the whole reform issue to
the other side of the 2002 elections. But the present deadlock can only be broken by the
federal government. And in order to revert the widespread mistrust that brought43
negotiations to a halt, the government has to show a credible commitment to a new tax
reform proposal, much bolder than the one announced in August 2000.
Concern with assuring the overall consistency of the new tax system that will stem from
the reform should not be taken to the point of assuming that all changes will have to take
place at the same moment. That would make the involved challenge seem to be more
formidable than it actually is. A wiser move would be to try to decompose the envisaged
reconstruction of the tax system in modules that would allow less complex political
negotiations, easier implementation and some degree of experimentation as the reform is
phased in. On the other hand, it seems that too much strain has been put on indirect
taxation in Brazil. The problem could become more tractable if part of that strain could be
shifted to direct taxes, as there seems to be ample room for a more intelligent exploitation
of the personal income-tax base in the country.
19
                                                          
19 A recent study conducted by the federal tax authorities concluded that the total revenue that is currently being
generated by the still highly complex income-tax system, which involves a top rate of 27.5 percent, could as well be
raised by a simple flat-tax arrangement, that would keep the present US$ 5,000 per year basic exemption level and
impose a tax rate of only 7.7 percent. That seems to be a good measure of the inefficacy of personal income taxation
in the country. See “Alíquota única para IR esbarra em resistência política e jurídica”, Valor Econômico, October 18,
2000.44
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